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THE HIGH COST OF ACCEPTING BENEFITS FROM THE CROWN: 
A COMMENT ON THE TEMAGAMI INDIAN LAND CASE 
Kent McNeil* 
On August 15, 1991, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down its decision in Bear Island 
Foundation v. The Queenl, ending a legal battle the Ontario government had been waging for 
nearly two decades against the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, an Algonkian First Nation 
inhabiting the Lake Temagami region of north-eastern Ontario. The legal dispute began in 
1973 when the Teme-Augama Anishnabai filed cautions in land titles offices in the region 
giving notice that they had Aboriginal title to lands which the province claimed as its own. 
Ontario commenced legal action to have the cautions removed, alleging that the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai had no claim to Aboriginal title, or if they did that their title had been extinguished 
by the Robinson-Huron Treaty of 1850. At trial, Mr. Justice Steele accepted Ontario's 
contentions, deciding that even if the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had succeeded in proving their 
Aboriginal title (which he found they did not), the treaty extinguished it.2 Upholding Steele's 
decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal avoided the issue of proof of Aboriginal title by 
assuming, without deciding, that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had Aboriginal land rights 
before the Robinson-Huron Treaty was signed. Relying on the treaty, the court said it 
extinguished their Aboriginal title because 
[t]he Temagami [as the court called the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai] were signatories to the treaty. Alternatively they 
adhered to the treaty by receiving annuities pursuant to it and 
later asking for a reserve as was promised in the treaty and still 
later receiving a reserve. Finally, their rights were extinguished, 
even if the Temagami were not signatories or adherents, because 
the treaty was at least a unilateral act of extinguishment by the 
sovereign authority.3 
In a two-page per curiam judgment, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the Court of 
Appeal's decision. In the Supreme Court's view, the case involved mainly factual issues, 
which on established principles an appellate court should not reverse "in the absence of 
palpable and overriding error which affected [the trial judge's] assessment of the facts".4 
Where the lower courts were in agreement on the facts, as in this case, the rule is even 
stronger. The Supreme Court said they had "undertaken a detailed examination of the facts on 
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this basis [and did] not take issue with the numerous specific findings of fact in the courts 
below".5 However, they observed that it did not necessarily follow 
... that we agree with all the legal findings based on those facts. 
In particular, we find that on the facts found by the trial judge 
the Indians exercised sufficient occupation of the lands in 
question throughout the relevant period to establish an aboriginal 
right. 6 
The court nonetheless found it unnecessary 
... to examine the specific nature of the aboriginal right because, 
in our view, whatever may have been the situation upon the 
signing of the Robinson-Huron Treaty, that right was in any 
event surrendered by arrangements subsequent to that treaty by 
which the Indians adhered to the treaty in exchange for treaty 
annuities and a reserve.7 
The Supreme Court therefore dismissed the appeal of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai for the 
second reason given by the Court of Appeal, i.e. adhesion to the treaty. 
The judgments of Steele and the Court of Appeal raised vital Aboriginal land rights issues 
which cannot be pursued here.8 Instead, this comment will focus on the Supreme Court's 
decision, and attempt to assess its significance for future land claims cases. In my view, the 
importance of the decision lies not so much in what was said as what was left unsaid, 
particularly the unarticulated assumptions lurking behind the court's words. 
1. The Teme-Augama Anishnabai's Aboriginal Title 
In favour of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, we have seen that, unlike Steele, the Supreme 
Court found on the facts established at trial that "the Indians exercised sufficient occupation of 
the lands in question throughout the relevant period to establish an aboriginal right. "9 In this 
respect, the court said, Steele "was misled by the considerations which appear in the passage 
from his reasons quoted earlier."10 The passage referred to, which summarizes Steele's 
findings regarding the Teme-Augama Anishnabai's entitlement to Aboriginal rights, reads: 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
I will deal with the entitlement of the defendants to aboriginal 
rights in the Land Claim Area. I find that the defendants have 
failed to prove that their ancestors were an organized band level 
8 For my analysis of the Court of Appeal's decision, see Kent McNeil, "The Temagami Indian Land Claim: 
Loosening the Judicial Strait-jacket", in Matt Bray and Ashley Thomson, eds., Temagami: A Debate on 
Wilderness (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1990), 185-221. More generally, see Tony Hall, "Where Justice Lies: 
Aboriginal Rights and Wrongs in Temagami", ibid., 223-55. 
9 [1991] 3 C.N.L.R. 79 at 81. 
10 Ibid. 
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of society in 1763; that, as an organized society, they had 
exclusive occupation of the Land Claim Area in 1763; or that, as 
an organized society, they continued to exclusively occupy and 
make aboriginal use of the Land Claim Area from 17 63 or the 
time of coming of settlement to the date the action was 
commenced.11 
But in what respect was Steele misled? As the Supreme Court accepted his factual findings, 
explicitly disagreeing only with his legal conclusion regarding the sufficiency of the Teme-
Augama Anishnabai's occupation during the relevant period, one might think that the test Steele 
applied for proof of Aboriginal occupation was too strict. However, a reading of Steele's 
judgment reveals that he decided the Teme-Augama Anishnabai did not have Aboriginal land 
rights because they were not an organized band in 1763, which for him was the relevant date 
for determining this issue in most of the Land Claim Area.12 In other words, the problem for 
Steele was not lack of adequate land use in that area by Aboriginal people during the relevant 
period,13 but insufficient evidence that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai existed as an organized 
band society at that time. He wrote: 
. . . I find that there is no evidence of the existence of a band or 
of its control over allocation of land in family hunting territories 
in 17 63 or until, at the earliest, 1850. There is no evidence that 
there was an organized society in 1763 encompassing all the 
families on the charts. 
After trading posts were established [in the first half of the 
nineteenth century], the most one can say is that a small, loose, 
flexible and fluid band came into being, never covering all of the 
Land Claim Area. This continued until the late eighteen 
hundreds. The territory of the band changed depending upon 
the families who were members of the band . . . There was no 
central control group that governed a fixed band territory over a 
long period of time or that had the power to refuse to allow a 
family hunting group to change its allegiance, thereby forcing 
the family hunting group's lands to remain part of the band's 
lands. The family controlled the land and decided which band it 
wished to belong to.14 
Later, Steele concluded on the evidence that 
... the persons identified by the defendants as Temagami Indians 
and as a part of the Temagami band were simply heads of 
11 Ibid., quoting from [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 21. 
12 See [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 40-77. Steele chose 1763 as the relevant date for most of the Land Claim Area 
because that was the year the Royal Proclamation had been issued. For the small portion of that area lying north 
of the height of land iri the Hudson watershed, and therefore beyond the Proclamation's scope in Steele's view (for 
criticism of this view, see McNeil, supra, n.8 at 209 n.5), he said the relevant date was "the coming of 
settlement": ibid., 32-3. 
13 Ibid., especially 39 where Steele listed "the aboriginal rights in these lands existing at the relevant date." 
14 Ibid., 51-2. 
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families and did not, as families themselves, form an organized 
Temagami band with a chief. The first reference in the trading 
post journals to a Temagami who was a chief is in 187 4. This 
was after the 1850 treaty .15 
43 
In order to find that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had an Aboriginal right to their lands, the 
Supreme Court probably disagreed with Steele on this point, concluding instead that they were 
an organized society at the relevant time.16 However, it is also possible that the court 
disagreed with Steele's choice of 1763 as the relevant date.17 The court may even have 
questioned his requirement that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai prove that their ancestors were 
an organized society at that time.18 More obviously, the court must have rejected Steele's 
requirement that exclusive Aboriginal occupation continue up to the time litigation on their land 
claim is commenced.19 On this matter, Steele concluded that, even if the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai at one time had Aboriginal title, 
... such title was in fact extinguished because the Indians have 
abandoned their traditional use and occupation of the Land Claim 
Area. In other words, there is no evidence of exclusive 
aboriginal use of any of the lands except the Bear Island Reserve 
continuing to the date of the commencement of the action.20 
15 Ibid., 66; see also 71-2. 
16 For support for this conclusion, see Bruce W. Hodgins and Jamie Benidickson, The Temagami Experience: 
Recreation, Resources, and Aboriginal Rights in the Northern Ontario Wilderness (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1989), 9-26, where the authors describe the Teme-Augama Anishnabai's existence as a "band" or 
"tribe" prior to and following European contact. 
1 7 As Dickson J., in Guerin v. The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335, [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120 at 132-3, said that 
Aboriginal rights pre-date the Royal Proclamation (see also Roberts v. Canada [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322, [1989] 2 
C.N.L.R. 146 at 156), and do not depend on that prerogative instrument for their existence, there is no obvious 
reason why 1763 should be the relevant date, even in the part of Canada ceded to Britain from France in that year: 
see McNeil, supra, n.8 at 187-8, 212 n.24. In fact, Steele admitted this in an "Addendum" to his decision written 
after the Supreme Court decision in Guerin, [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 119. 
18 This requirement came from Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs [1980] 1 F.C. 518, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17 at 
45, and was apparently derived from Judson J.'s statement in Calder v. A.-G. of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 
313 at 328: "the fact is that when the settlers came, the Indians were there, organized in societies and occupying 
the land as their forefathers had done for centuries. This is what Indian title means". But did Judson intend to 
make the existence of an organized society a prerequisite for Aboriginal title, or was he simply stating a general 
fact of Aboriginal life? Moreover, in Calder at 368, 375, Hall J. applied the common law rule that possession is 
proof of ownership to Aboriginal occupation. At common law, application of this rule does not require 
occupation of lands by an organized society: see Kent McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 42-3, 56-8, 75, 207-8. 
19 The requirement that occupation be exclusive was also articulated in Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs 
[1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17 at 45. However, Aboriginal rights involving land use, such as hunting and fishing rights, 
do not have to be exercised exclusively in order to continue: see n.21, infra. Moreover, in the United States 
courts have decided that Indian title can be derived from occupation which is not exclusive where two or more 
tribes jointly and amicably use the same lands: see Turtle Mountain Band v. U.S., 490 F. 2d 935 at 944 (1974); 
U.S. v. Pueblo of San Ildefonso, 513 F. 2d 1383 at 1394-5 (1975); Strong v. U.S., 518 F. 2d 556 at 561-2 
(1975), certiorari denied 423 U.S. 1015 (1975). 
20 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 77. Note that Steele's conclusion that Aboriginal land rights can be abandoned by 
neglecting to continue exercising them stems from his erroneous view that those rights are not proprietary in 
nature: see text accompanying nn. 111-15, infra. 
[1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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This conclusion so clearly contradicts recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the 
continuation of Aboriginal rights that the judges must have rejected it. 21 But apart from that, 
their vague reference to sufficient occupation has simply cast doubt over which of Steele's legal 
conclusions on Aboriginal land rights are correct, and which are erroneous. If one role of the 
Supreme Court is to clarify controverted points of law and give guidance to lawyers and lower 
court judges, it has evidently failed to do so in this case, at least in so far as Aboriginal title is 
concerned. 
2. Adhesion to the Robinson-Huron Treaty 
The Supreme Court did decide that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai adhered to the Robinson-
Huron Treaty, and that upon adhesion their Aboriginal land rights were extinguished, whatever 
the nature of those rights may have been. These were the matters which, in the Supreme 
Court's view, raised mainly factual issues which were best left to the trial judge. We therefore 
need to examine the facts leading Steele J. to these conclusions, which the Supreme Court 
accepted. 
Steele began his examination of the treaty by outlining the background to it, and determining 
who the Indian parties to it were and what lands they surrendered. Regarding the Teme-
Augama Anishnabai, he concluded that their leader, Nebenegwune, was present at the signing 
and accepted a share of the initial cash payment under the treaty.22 However, Nebenegwune 
did not sign, in Steele's view because "he was not of sufficient importance as a chief or 
headman to warrant his signing" and because the Teme-Augama Anishnabai were not at the 
time a separate Aboriginal people, but were part of "a larger group comprised of three bands" 
who were represented at the treaty negotiations by Chief Tawgaiwene, who signed on their 
behalf.23 Steele found that Nebenegwune and some other members of the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai did receive treaty payments between 1850 and 1856, when the payments to them 
stopped, "likely because they did not wish to travel the long distance to receive the small 
payment."24 Steele also found that a reserve allocated to Tawgaiwene at Lake Wanapitei in 
1850 was intended for the Teme-Augama Anishnabai as well as for the other two groups 
represented by that chief.25 While the Supreme Court found it unnecessary to accept or reject 
Steele's conclusion from these findings that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai were made parties 
21 In Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160, cited by the Supreme Court in Bear 
Island on the issue of the sufficiency of Aboriginal occupation, the court held that the Musqueam Indians in 
British Columbia had an existing Aboriginal right to fish, even though that right had been heavily regulated by 
Parliament and was not exclusive. Moreover, the Supreme Court in Sparrow placed the onus of proving 
extinguishment of Aboriginal rights on the Crown, holding that the intention to extinguish must be "clear and 
plain" when it is alleged that extinguishment was brought about by legislation. In Simon v. The Queen, [1985] 
2 S.C.R. 387, [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 153, also cited by the court in this context in Bear Island, Dickson C.J.C., 
referring to a treaty right to hunt, said at 170: "Given the serious and far-reaching consequences of a finding that 
a treaty right has been extinguished, it seems appropriate to demand strict proof of the fact of extinguishment in 
each case where the issue arises. As Douglas J. said in United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Ry. Co. [(1941) 314 U.S. 
339], at p.354, 'extinguishment cannot be lightly implied'." Moreover, A.-G. of Quebec v. Sioui [1990] 1 
S.C.R. 1025, [1990] 3.C.N.L.R. 127 at 154, the Supreme Court held that a treaty right cannot be extinguished by 
non-user. 
22 Contrast Hodgins and Benidickson, supra, n.16 at 33-4. 
23 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 84, 90. 
24 Ibid., 90. 
25 Contrast Hodgins and Benidickson supra, n.16 at 34-5. 
[1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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to the treaty by Tawgaiwene's signature, Steele's views on these matters are relevant to the 
question of adhesion, which he went on to deal with.26 
According to the evidence relied on by Steele, members of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai 
began requesting treaty annuity payments in 1877. In 1878 their chief, Tonene, told Indian 
Agent Skene that they had received treaty money and presents in the past, and requested that 
the payments recommence.27 Around the same time, in Steele's words, 
[t]he Indians also told him [Skene] that no reserve had been set 
aside for them, that the lumbermen were now coming close to 
them, and that therefore they wanted a reserve. Skene reported 
that the Indians stated that they had never ceded their lands and 
knew nothing about the Robinson-Huron Treaty. When Skene 
asked how, in that case, the Indians could have received the 
money and presents at Manitoulin Island, the Indians merely 
replied that Chief Kekek [their chief at the time] received money 
on account of the band and also presents, and even gave details 
as to what the gifts were.28 
This passage reveals that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai do not seem to have understood that 
the payments and so-called gifts were related to the treaty.29 But they knew that they had 
received those benefits in the past, and were probably aware that members of neighbouring 
bands were still receiving payments, so they wanted to be paid too. 
The request for a reserve, however, was directly related to adverse use of their lands by 
lumbermen, and seems to have been understood as involving a surrender of some of their land 
rights. Steele wrote: 
In February of 1881, it was reported that Chief Tonene was 
saying that timber was being taken, and that he wanted a meeting 
with the band in council with respect to negotiating a treaty for 
the surrender of their lands. In June of 1881, Skene asked 
Chief Tonene for his terms for a surrender. In August of that 
year, Chief Tonene advised Skene that he wanted money and 
suggested $4 per person annually [the amount of the treaty 
annuity at that time], plus a reserve. On August 26, 1882, 
Jocko Tawgaiwene [son of Chief Tawgaiwene who signed the 
treaty in 1850] applied to Canada to have the Temagami Indians 
placed on the Robinson-Huron Treaty annuity list.30 
26 The Court of Appeal, as we have seen, expressly agreed with Steele's conclusion that the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai were represented by Tawgaiwene at the treaty negotiations: [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 79-83. For 
commentary, see McNeil, supra, n.8 at 189-93. 
27 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 72. Allegations were also made that treaty payments had been accepted by certain Indian 
leaders on behalf of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, but had not been turned over to them: ibid., 92. 
28 Ibid., 72. 
29 As the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had previously received gifts from the Crown which bore no relation to the 
treaty, they would not necessarily have made the connection between the two: see Hodgins and Benidickson, 
supra, n.16 at 34. 
30 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 92. 
[1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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The requested meeting with the band in council does not appear to have taken place. Instead, 
the federal Department of Indian Affairs, which at the time thought that the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai were not parties to the original treaty,31 decided to add them to the treaty pay list 
because they appeared willing to become parties.32 Annuity payments were accordingly made 
to the Teme-Augama Anishnabai from 1883 until 1979, when they began to return the cheques 
because they claimed that they had never surrendered their Aboriginal land rights.33 
Although added to the pay list, the Teme-Augama Anishnabai waited a long time for a reserve. 
Over the next 60 years, they made numerous requests for a reserve, to be located at Austin Bay 
on Lake Temagami.34 Some 6f these requests were expressly related to entitlement under the 
Robinson-Huron Treaty, while others- such as a 1910 request for a reserve so that they would 
be able to cut timber for building and firewood - were not. In 1943, lands on Bear Island were 
finally set aside by Ontario for a reserve subject to certain conditions, but the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai continued to press for a reserve at Austin Bay. In 1947, they passed a formal band 
resolution declaring, in Steele's words, that 
... Austin Bay was never surrendered by the band, nor was the 
band a party to any treaty-making convention. They also 
declared that their forefathers were not a party to the Robinson-
Huron Treaty and that their band had never consented to a 
surrender nor ceded any tract of land or lands which they had 
occupied from time immemoriaI.35 
In 1964, however, the Teme-Augama Anishnabai appear to have passed a resolution requesting 
that Bear Island be officially made a reserve, which the government of Canada finally did in 
June 1971.36 
Steele summed up his assessment of the above and other less important facts as follows: 
While there have been two or three occasions during the period 
from 1883 to date when the band, or its chief on its behalf, have 
denied that they ever entered into any treaty or surrendered their 
lands, the overwhelming majority of the documents indicates an 
acknowledgement and acceptance of the treaty. I am of the 
opinion that those documents that denied the treaty, in the years 
prior to the 1973 minutes indicating that a lawyer had been 
retained, were merely a bargaining ploy in the negotiation 
attempts to obtain the reserve at Austin Bay and later at Bear 
Island that had been promised to them. I believe these 
documents originated from a sense of frustration, and reflected 
31 See Hodgins and Benidickson, supra, n.16 at 46. The Court of Appeal said the federal government's position was 
based on incomplete records: [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 84. 
32 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 92. 
33 Ibid., 91-2; [1989] 3 CN.L.R. 73 at 84. 
34 See Hodgins and Benidickson, supra, n.16 at 47-8, 65-7, 136-8, 211-17. 
3 5 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 94. 
36 Ibid. 
[1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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the hope of expediting the establishment of a reserve. 
Notwithstanding their wording, when seen in their historical 
context, I do not interpret them as being a denial of the fact that 
there was a treaty to which the band had been properly bound.37 
47 
In this facile way, Steele dismissed contrary evidence by patronizingly concluding that the 
Teme-Augama Anishnabai were not sincere when they asserted that they had never entered the 
treaty or surrendered their lands.38 How could he know that? Most of these assertions were 
made in uncontroverted written documents, rather than by witnesses whose credibility Steele 
could attempt to assess. His remarkable ability to perceive the hidden motivations of people he 
had never met from written words is all the more suspect when one considers the cross-cultural 
context in which his assessments were made. What he purported to do was to read the minds 
of people from an entirely different culture, whose worldview he did not share. In these 
circumstances, the danger of misinterpreting their words and actions is very great, and must be 
carefully guarded against.39 Unfortunately, Steele does not appear to have even been aware of 
the problem. 40 
The situation the Teme-Augama Anishnabai found themselves in after the Robinson-Huron 
Treaty was signed should be remembered. Lumbermen and others were encroaching on their 
territory and interfering with their traditional uses of the land.41 By the early 20th century, the 
Ontario government was further restricting those uses by imposing hunting and fishing 
regulations and even limiting Indian use of timber for building and firewood.42 Their 
Aboriginal rights to the land were not being respected, so the treaty may have looked like a 
viable alternative for protecting their way of life and securing economic benefits. However, a 
formal adhesion to the treaty was never signed, and a reserve was not set aside for them until 
1943, and not officially created until 1971. If they adhered to the treaty in 1883, when they 
started taking annuity payments, they should then have been entitled to a lump sum payment 
(which they do not appear to have received) and a reserve. Moreover, the reserve on Bear 
Island that was eventually created was not the reserve they had requested, and was much 
smaller than treaty-entitlement reserves.43 Given the fact that they had not been accorded full 
37 Ibid., 94-5. 
3 8 This was not the only time Steele disregarded evidence which did not support his conclusions. On several 
occasions, he dismissed opinions of expert witnesses because he said they were biased in favour of the Indians. 
Referring to three of these witnesses, he said they "were typical of persons who have worked closely with Indians 
for so many years that they have lost their objectivity when giving opinion evidence": ibid., 37. Apparently 
"objectivity" depends on maintaining a non-Indian perspective, which close contact with Aboriginal people can 
interfere with. The ethnocentricity inherent in this attitude is blatant and unacceptable. See Hall, supra, n.8 esp. 
232-3. 
39 See Rupert Ross, "Leaving Our White Eyes Behind: The Sentencing of Native Accused" [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 1; 
Clare Brant, "Native Ethics and Rules of Behaviour" (Aug. 1990) 35 Can. J. Psychiatry 534-9. 
40 For discussion of another instance where Steele ignored cross-cultural factors in assessing the evidence, see 
McNeil, supra, n. 8 at 191. 
41 See Hodgins and Benidickson, supra, n.16 at 49-67. 
42 See ibid., 136-46; Teme-Augama Anishnabai, "The Native Dimension: Key Dates", in Matt Bray and Ashley 
Thomson, eds., Temagami: A Debate on Wilderness (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1990), 147-51, at 148. 
43 Approximately one square mile was set aside for the reserve on Bear Island: see Hodgins and Benidickson, supra, 
n.16 at 217. This appears to be smaller than any of the seventeen reserves created by the Robinson-Huron 
Treaty: see the schedule to the treaty in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians (Toronto: 
Belfords, Clarke & Co., 1880; reprinted Toronto: Coles Publishing, 1979), 306-8 (the treaty defines the 
boundaries of all the reserves, but only specifies the area of ten of them; of those specified, the average area is 
[1992] 1 C.N.L.R. 
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treaty benefits, the Teme-Augama Anishnabai may well have believed that their request to be 
brought into the treaty had not been accepted. 
The position of the Crown in right of Canada, which was paying them annuities and trying to 
get lands for a reserve from the province of Ontario,44 would have confirmed this belief. At no 
time during the relevant period did Canada regard the annuities or the eventual creation of a 
reserve as sufficient to make the Teme-Augama Anishnabai parties to the treaty. But after the 
matter went to court in 1978, the federal government changed its mind. Steele outlined 
Canada's position as follows: 
Throughout the period of 1883 to the date of trial, Canada has 
consistently taken the position that the Temagami Indians did not 
sign the treaty and that their Indian title has not been 
extinguished, while Ontario consistently has taken the position 
that the Temagami Indians were party to the treaty and that their 
title has been extinguished. Ontario's actions over the years 
confirm its position. At trial, Canada, though represented only 
with respect to the constitutional issue, has through its counsel 
now taken the position that the Indians have adhered to the treaty 
and are bound by it. Canada's previous position is somewhat 
suspect because, if the Indians were not party to the treaty, why 
were they admitted to the Robinson-Huron pay list in 1883, and 
why has Canada consistently argued for a reserve for the 
Indians?45 
In answer to Steele's query, because Ontario was not respecting the Aboriginal rights of the 
Teme-Augama Anishnabai, Canada may well have decided that they should at least be given 
annuities equivalent to those of treaty Indians. Moreover, Canada's argument for a reserve 
was not based on the view that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai were already parties to the 
Robinson-Huron Treaty, but on the necessity for Ontario to agree to a reserve as part of a 
settlement of their Aboriginal land claim. 46 In this context, it is important to observe that, 
9.4 square miles). The discrepancy is not explained by population. The original Indian signatories of the treaty, 
who numbered 1422, would have received approximately one square mile for every nine persons, assuming an 
average reserve size of 9.4 square miles. The Teme-Augama Anishnabai, who according to the 1887 census 
numbered 93 (Hodgins and Benidickson, supra, n.16 at 65), should therefore have been entitled to a reserve of at 
least ten square miles in the 1880s, if they adhered to the treaty at that time. 
44 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 93. 
45 Ibid., 95. 
46 As a consequence of the decision in St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888), 14 App. Cas. 
46, Canada agreed in 1891 to the concurrence of Ontario in any future Indian treaties in the province: see An Act 
for the Settlement of Certain Questions Between the Governments of Canada and Ontario Respecting Indian 
Lands, S.C. 1891, c.5. In a "Statement of Case of the Dominion on Behalf of the Temogamingue Band of 
Ojibbewa Indians", dated March 10, 1896, from Indian Affairs to the Board of Arbitrators set up under that 
statute, Canada stated that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai were not parties to Robinson-Huron Treaty and had not 
surrendered their Aboriginal land rights. The statement went on to claim that the arbitrators "should direct the 
Province of Ontario to grant to the said Indians a reserve, or to acquiesce and approve of the said reserve so 
surveyed as aforesaid, and upon such terms as to surrender of the Indian title in the remaining portions of the said 
tract as [to] the Board would seem just and fair": as quoted in Chief Gary Potts, "Teme-Augama Anishnabai: Last-
Ditch Defence of a Priceless Homeland", in Boyce Richardson, ed., Drumbeat: Anger and Renewal in Indian 
Country (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989), 201-28, at 215. 
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unlike the so-called numbered treaties, the treaty does not provide for an overall surrender of 
Indian lands, with reserves to be created subsequently out of those lands; instead, the reserves 
were expressly excluded from the surrender, thereafter to "be held and occupied by the said 
Chiefs and their tribes in common, for their own use and benefit" .47 So for the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai to adhere to the treaty, it would appear to be essential that agreement be reached in 
advance on what lands were to be reserved out of the lands being surrendered, for otherwise 
they would be left with no lands at all, and no provision in the treaty on which to rely for the 
creation of a reserve after the surrender. Canada's position on the Teme-Augama Anishnabai 
land claim prior the trial is consistent with this interpretation. 
As for Ontario, the relevance of its attitude to the adhesion issue is questionable because the 
province would not have been a party to any treaty negotiations that may have taken place 
between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Canada in the 1880s.48 If the position of any 
government is suspect in this matter, it is that of Ontario, which, as a result of the decisions of 
the Privy Council in St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen49 and Ontario 
Mining Company v. Seybold,50 was entitled to all the lands surrendered by Indian treaties in 
the province without having to incur any of the costs. Ontario was simply a self-interested 
third party with no privity and therefore no say in whether or not a treaty had at that time been 
concluded between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and the federal Crown.51 
The Supreme Court nonetheless accepted Steele's factual findings and concluded in regard to 
the Teme-Augama Anishnabai's Aboriginal land right that, "whatever may have been the 
situation upon the signing of the Robinson-Huron Treaty, that right was in any event 
surrendered by arrangements subsequent to that treaty by which the Indians adhered to the 
treaty in exchange for treaty annuities and a reserve. "52 As we have seen, the court 
emphasized that the case raised "for the most part essentially factual issues on which the courts 
4 7 Robinson-Huron Treaty, in Morris, supra, n.43 at 305. 
48 Although the province of Canada had negotiated and signed the original Robinson-Huron Treaty on behalf of the 
Crown in 1850, section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Viet., c.3 (U.K.), placed treaty-making 
authority in federal hands by assigning Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for 
the Indians": see St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46 at 59, where Lord 
Watson said that "[i]t appears to be the plain policy of the Act [of 1867] that, in order to ensure uniformity of 
administration, all such lands, and Indian affairs generally, shall be under the legislative control of one central 
authority." Ontario's concurrence in future treaties in the province became a statutory requirement in 1891: see 
n.46, supra. 
49 (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46. 
50 [1903] A.C. 73. 
51 Moreover, Steele was not entirely ace.mate when he said that Ontario consistently took the position that the 
Teme-Augama Anishnabai were parties to the treaty. Aubrey White, Ontario's Deputy Minister of Lands and 
Forests, "in his formal recommendation for the creation of the Temagami Forest Reserve in 1901 ... frankly 
stated that 'by oversight or neglect' the Temagami Indians were not represented at the Robinson treaty and 
consequently did not receive a reservation": Hodgins arid Benidickson, supra, n.16 at 139. What Ontario really 
wanted was to have it both ways: the province denied that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had existing Aboriginal 
land rights, while refusing for almost 60 years to provide land for a reserve. In its factum before the Court of 
Appeal in the Bear Island case, the Attorney General for Ontario admitted that "from 1885 until 1939 the 
government of Ontario was unresponsive and intransigent": [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 85. That is an 
understatement! In 1929, Walter Cain, Deputy Minister of Lands and Forests, even had the gall to write to Chief 
Alex Mathias and some other members of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and demand that they pay rent to the 
province for their own homes on Bear Island: see Hodgins and Benidickson, supra, n.16 at 211; Potts, supra, 
n.46 at 217. 
52 [1991] 3 C.N.L.R. 79 at 81. 
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below were in agreement. "S3 However, in my view a vital legal issue arising out of the facts 
was not addressed judicially at any level in this case, namely, as a matter of law what must be 
done for an Aboriginal people to become party to an Indian treaty by adhesion? Implicit in all 
three judgments is the assumption that accepting benefits provided by a treaty is sufficient, but 
no explanation or analysis of this assumption is given. As a general rule, is the acceptance of 
benefits under an existing agreement between other parties sufficient to make the beneficiary a 
party? Do both the beneficiary and the original parties have to consent to the beneficiary 
becoming a party? Can that consent be implicit? In the context of Indian treaties, what 
formalities are necessary for adhesion? What if some benefits are conferred but not others, or 
the conferred benefits are not as ample as those provided in the treaty? And when does the 
adhesion take place, particularly if the benefits are conferred piecemeal over an extended period 
of time? Although all these issues were relevant to the case, none were adequately addressed, 
and most were simply ignored. 
3. Principles of Treaty Adhesion 
Starting with the questions involving acceptance of benefits by a third party under agreements 
generally, both international law on treaties and domestic law on contracts are relevant.S4 
Internationally, a state which is not an original party to a treaty can adhere or accede to it only if 
the original parties consent, either by including an accession clause in the treaty anticipating 
accession by that state or states generally, or by otherwise agreeing to the accession.SS As for 
the acceding state, its consent to be bound by the treaty must be expressed in a formal written 
document. Lord McNair, a leading authority on treaty law, wrote: 
S3 Ibid. 
Like a treaty, an accession is a formal instrument, and it is 
inconceivable that an oral communication would suffice. No 
precise form is required for an accession. All that is required is 
a notification to the original contracting parties or to such other 
authority as may be indicated in the treaty ... s6 
S4 Although the Supreme Court of Canada in Simon v. The Queen, [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 1S3 at 169, said that Indian 
treaties are sui generis, international and contract law can be of persuasive value when new issues respecting 
these treaties arise. Moreover, I would argue that, where failure to apply international or contract law principles 
to Indian treaties is detrimental to Aboriginal interests, convincing reasons for not applying those principles 
should be given (this argument is indirectly supported by Supreme Court decisions, including Simon and other 
cases discussed infra in text accompanying nn. 132-6, that .treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be 
construed in their favour). While the examination of contract law in this article is limited to Anglo-Canadian 
common law, civil law principles are also relevant, particularly where treaties relating to Quebec are concerned. 
SS L. Oppenheim, International Law (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 190S), vol. 1, S46; Lord McNair, The 
Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), lSl; J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations, 8th ed. by Sir Humphrey 
Waldock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 322; T.O. Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties (Dobbs Ferry, 
N.Y.: Oceana Publications, 1974), 24-S. For further discussion, see Kaye Halloway, Modern Trends in Treaty 
Law (London: Stevens and Sons, 1967), 8S-90. This customary rule has been codified in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (in force as of 27 January 1980), Art. lS, in Ian Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents in 
International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), 233 at 239. 
S6 McNair, supra, n.SS at 1S2 (footnotes omitted). See also the Vienna Convention, supra, n.SS, Art. 16. 
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An international treaty which purports to confer rights or impose obligations on a third state is 
not binding on that state without its consent.57 Where third state rights are concerned, the 
issue of enforcement is controversial. Professor O'Connell observed: 
It might be argued that the enforcement of the beneficial clauses 
is left to the contracting parties, and that the beneficiary cannot 
itself initiate remedial action; the appropriate method of achieving 
this active participation in the treaty as distinct from passive 
receipt of its benefits would be by an accession clause. Or it 
could be argued that the third State upon acceptance of the 
benefit acquires legal rights itself. Even those who take the 
second of these alternative positions divide as to the significance 
of acceptance. One view is that acceptance is an accession or 
adhesion, so that the accepting party becomes in all respects a 
party to a new treaty identical in content with the old; but that if 
there is an accession clause acceptance can only occur in 
accordance with it, and cannot be implied by conduct. Another 
view is that the third State in accepting the benefit does not 
accede to the treaty but appropriates the stipulated rights. The 
effect of the acceptance is to deprive the contracting States of the 
liberty to withdraw the privilege, and to permit the beneficiary to 
insist upon the favourable stipulation and no other. 58 
So even in a case where third state benefits are specifically provided in a treaty, only some 
commentators think that acceptance of those benefits makes the third state a party, albeit to a 
new treaty.59 However, the purpose for making the third state a party is not to impose 
obligations on it, but to enable it to enforce the terms of the treaty which are intended to confer 
benefits on it. 60 Terms purporting to impose opligations on the third state would not be 
binding on it without its consent. 61 
5 7 McNair, supra, n.55 at 309-21; Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 4th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), 622-4; Elias, supra, n.55 at 59-70. This general rule has been codified by the Vienna Convention, 
supra, n.55, Art. 34-6, esp. Art. 34: "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without 
its consent." See discussion in Sir Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd ed. 
(Manchester: University Press, 1984), 98-106. 
58 D.P. O'Connell, International Law, 2nd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1970), vol. 1, 247 (footnotes omitted). 
Note that O'Connell was describing customary international law, unaffected by the Vienna Convention, supra, 
n.55, for the same passage appears in the first edition of his book (same publisher, 1965), vol. 1, 266-7, written 
before the Convention was drafted. 
59 The authority O'Connell gave for this view was Ronald F. Roxburgh, International Conventions and Third States 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1917), 45, where Roxburgh referred specifically to situations where the 
treaty provided for accession by the third state; cf. 51-3.. The suggestion that a new treaty is created merely by 
acceptance of benefits by a third state is convincingly refuted by Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, "Treaty 
Stipulations in Favor of Third States" (1956) 50 A.J.I.L. 338-57, at 351-5. See also L. Oppenheim, 
International Law, 8th ed. by H. Lauterpacht (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1955), vol. 1, 925-7. 
60 Philippe Braud, "Recherches sur l'Etat tiers en droit international public" (1968) 72 R.G.D.I.P. 17-96, at 57: 
"Seule la clause favorable fait l'objet du consentement, non le traite dans son entier." See also Jimenez de 
Arechaga, supra, n.59 at 351-6, esp. 355: "by means of stipulations in favor of third parties it is possible to 
confer rights only and not to impose obligations on the third party." Cf. Roxburgh, supra, n.59 at 45, where the 
author states that obligations can be incurred if there is an accession. 
61 O'Connell, supra, n.58, vol. 1 at 246, in the context of the Vienna Convention, Art. 35-6, supra, n.55, wrote 
that "[c]onsent is presumed in the case of rights but must be express in the case of obligations." Art. 35 
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In Anglo-Canadian contract law, the issue of adhesion or accession does not appear to have 
received much attention, probably because it seldom arises. More common is a situation like 
that just described in international treaty law where a contract purports to confer benefits or 
impose obligations on a third party who was not privy to the original agreement. As a general 
rule, a contract of this sort cannot be enforced by or against the third party.62 In the leading 
case of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. Selfridge & Co., Viscount Haldane said: 
[I]n the law of England certain principles are fundamental. One 
is that only a person who is a party to a contract can sue on it. 
Our law knows nothing of a jus quaesitum tertio arising by way 
of contract. 63 
A related issue in contract law arises where one person confers. a benefit on another in 
circumstances which may imply an agreement to pay for it. For example, a company might 
send a product to a consumer with a stipulation that failure to return it within a specified time 
creates an obligation to pay the purchase price. 64 In this kind of situation, the courts have held 
that acceptance of contractual obligations cannot be implied from silence, but must relate to a 
prior promise to pay.65 Acceptance can, however, be implied from conduct in some 
circumstances, but only if the acts unequivocally suggest an intention to enter contractual 
relations.66 After reviewing a number of cases where this issue arose, Professor G.H.L. 
Fridman, in his text The Law of Contract in Canada, concluded: 
In these cases some positive conduct on the part of the person to 
whom the offer was made was called for and occurred. What 
was done by the offeree did not have to be formulated 
specifically as an acceptance of the offer in the sense of stating 
precisely, "I accept". It had to take the form of an act or acts 
referable to the offeree's wishing to be bound and wishing to 
bind the offeror on the terms stipulated by the off eror. 67 
Of course, for there to be a valid acceptance by conduct an offer must first be made. As 
Fridman wrote, "[i]f there is no such offer, or the purported offer is simply an expression of 
benevolent intention, then there is no contract to be spelled out of the fact that services were 
provides: "An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to the treaty intend the 
provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third State expressly accepts that obligation in 
writing." See also Braud, supra, n.60 at 65-7. 
62 For exceptions (e.g. regarding agency, trusts, restrictive covenants, etc.) and discussion, see G.H.L. Fridman, 
The Law of Contract in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1986), 161-89; M.P. Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot and 
Furmston's Law of Contract, llth ed. (London: Butterworths, 1986), 437-55; A.G. Guest, Anson's Law of 
Contract, 26th ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 363-89. 
63 [1915] A.C. 847 at 853. See also Price v. Easton (1833), 4 B.& Ad. 433; Tweddle v. Atkinson (1861), 1 B. & S. 
393; Bilson v. Kokotow (1975), 57 D.L.R. (3d) 647. 
64 Note that this kind of situation is now commonly governed by statute: e.g. see the Consumer Protection Act, 
R.S.0. 1990, c.C.31, s.36. 
65 See Deglman v. Guaranty Trust, [1954] S.C.R. 725. Compare Upton-on-Severn R.D.C. v. Powell, [1942] 1 All 
E.R. 220, where a contract was found because there was a request for the services, though by mistake they were 
not rendered by the party intended. 
66 Fridman, supra, n.62 at 46. See also Ramsden v. Chessum (1913), 30 T.L.R. 68. 
67 Fridman, supra, n.62 at 47. 
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rendered and not rejected".68 The essential element here is an unequivocal mutual intention, 
expressed by either words or actions, to enter into a binding agreement. 69 If this intention is 
absent on either side, a contract is not created.70 
So in both international and municipal law, it appears that mere acceptance of benefits will not 
suffice to bind the beneficiary to a legally-enforceable agreement. An additional element -
namely an intention to enter a binding agreement by both the person conferring and the person 
receiving the benefits - must be present 71 Moreover, in international law accession to a treaty 
requires the consent of all the original parties. 
If the requirement of consent by the original parties is applied to Indian treaties, all adhesions 
not specifically provided for could be invalidated.72 In the case of the Robinson-Huron 
Treaty, adhesion by the Teme-Augama Anishnabai would be invalidated because the original 
Ojibway signatories consented only to the adhesion of "the Indians inhabiting French River and 
Lake Nipissing".73 However, it may be inappropriate at this late date to apply a rule of 
international law which no one appears to have considered when adhesions to Indian treaties 
were signed.74 
Be that as it may, the general rule that binding agreements depend on mutual intention has been 
applied to Indian treaties by the Supreme Court of Canada. In Simon v. The Queen, Dickson 
C.J.C., in his discussion of the capacity of the parties to sign a 1752 Nova Scotia treaty, said 
that "both the Governor and the Micmac entered into the treaty with the intention of creating 
mutually binding obligations which would be solemnly respected. "75 Later, he described the 
treaty as 
68 Ibid., 49. 
... an exchange of solemn promises between the Micmacs and 
the King's representative entered into to achieve and guarantee 
peace. It is an enforceable obligation between the Indians and 
the white man ... 76 
69 See Balfour v. Balfour, [1919) 2 K.B. 571; A.-G. for British Columbia v. Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway, 
[1950) A.C. 87 at 108; Jones v. Padavatton, [1969) 2 All E.R. 616. 
70 Note, however, that the test for intention is objective rather than subjective. In other words, the parties do not 
need to actually have the intent, as long as a reasonable outside observer would infer intent from their words or 
actions. See Guest, supra, n.62 at 61-3; P.S. Atiyah, An Introduction to the Law of Contract, 4th ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), 10-11. 
71 Sir Robert Phillimore, in his Commentaries upon International Law, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1882), vol. 
2 at 75, wrote that "the free reciprocal consent of both contracting parties, which is indispensable to the validity 
of a contract between individuals, is equally requisite for a Treaty between States." 
72 Adhesions were very common, and generally do not appear to have been consented to by the original Indian 
parties: e.g. see adhesions to Treaties 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 in Morris, supra, n.43 at 326-9, 335-8, 349-50, 360-7, 
374-5. 
73 Text of the treaty, ibid., 306. 
7 4 The rule would also be avoided if Steele J.'s suggestion in Bear Island, [1985) 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 95, that_~cts of 
adhesion could constitute a "separate treaty" is-accepted. However, neither the Court of Appeal nor the Supreme 
Court of Canada adopted that suggestion. 
75 [1986) 1 C.N.L.R. 153 at 166. 
76 Ibid., 174. 
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In Attorney-General of Quebec v. Sioui, Lamer J. quoted these passages from Simon and 
concluded from them that "it is clear that what characterizes a treaty is the intention to create 
obligations, the presence of mutually binding obligations and a certain measure of 
solemnity. "77 
This requirement of mutual intent to create binding obligations is just as applicable to adhesions 
as to treaty creation. So how was the Supreme Court able to conclude in the Bear Island case 
that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai adhered to the Robinson-Huron Treaty? Intention is a 
matter of fact, and the court said that it accepted the facts which were found by Steele J. at trial 
and affirmed by the Court of Appeal. But Steele found that the Canadian government, from the 
1880s right up to the time of trial, consistently denied that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had 
been made a party to the treaty.78 So as far as the Crown was concerned, the payment of 
annuities and the eventual creation of the small reserve on Bear Island did not result in an 
adhesion, and did not extinguish the Aboriginal land rights of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai. 
The requisite intention of the Crown, by the admission of its own officials, was therefore 
absent. As for the Teme-Augama Anishnabai, at times they asked to be brought into the treaty 
so that they would receive its benefits, but on other occasions they denied having accepted the 
treaty. These positions were not inconsistent. The Teme-Augama Anishnabai may have been 
willing to accept the treaty if they received full treaty benefits, in particular a reserve of 
appropriate size at Austin Bay, but in fact that never happened.79 As the reserve they 
eventually did receive was inadequate by the treaty's standards, they were not satisfied. Until 
full treaty benefits were accorded to them, they were unwilling to give up their Aboriginal land 
rights.SO 
Steele J. did not address this issue of intention directly. As we have seen, he chose instead to 
dismiss the strong evidence of lack of intention on both sides by characterizing the Teme-
Augama Anishnabai's denials of the treaty as a "bargaining ploy", and Canada's denials as 
"somewhat suspect". In other words, he did not believe either of them, for reasons which in 
my view were simply inadequate,81 and which should have led the Supreme Court to find a 
"palpable and overriding error".82 Nevertheless, by expressly dismissing the strong evidence 
to the contrary, Steele appears to have implicitly found that the requisite intention to effect an 
adhesion existed on both sides. 83 The Supreme Court's affirmation of this aspect of his 
decision therefore does not undermine the rule that Indian treaties and adhesions, like other 
77 [1990) 3 C.N.L.R. 127 at 139. Lamer, at 139-40, also referred with apparent approval to Bisson J.A.'s 
description of a treaty, in his majority Quebec Court of Appeal judgment in Sioui, [1987] 4 C.N.L.R. 118 at 127, 
as "an agreement in which the contracting parties ... intended to create mutual obligations which they intended to 
observe". 
7 8 See text accompanying nn. 44-5, supra. 
79 See text accompanying nn. 34-43, supra. 
8 0 See Potts, supra, n.46 at 210-21. 
81 [1985) 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 94, 95: see text accompanying nn. 37-47, supra. 
82 This is the test used by appeal courts to reverse a trial judge's factual findings: [1991) 3 C.N.L.R. 79 at 81. 
83 Due to the implicit nature of this finding, it is impossible to determine whether Steele used a subjective or 
objective test of intention. I would nonetheless suggest that, in the cross-cultural context of Indian treaties, an 
objective test could be applied only if adequate account were taken of the divergent perspectives of both sides. 
Most Canadian judges would be unable to do this without expert evidence on the cultural values and psychosocial 
differences of the Aboriginal people involved, which may not be available, especially in the case of old treaties. 
On the problem of trying to interpret the actions of Aboriginal people from a Euro-Canadian perspective, see 
Ross, Brant, supra, n.39. 
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agreements, require a mutual intention to create binding obligations. One can only hope that 
courts will take the application of this rule more seriously in the future. 
For a mutual intention to enter into or adhere to a treaty to have effect, it must also be acted 
upon. In the case of international treaties, we have seen that adhesion or accession requires a 
formal written communication to the original parties or to some other authority designated in 
the treaty. 84 In the case of adhesion to Indian treaties, the practice in Canada has been for the 
representatives of the Crown and the Aboriginal people involved to sign a formal document of 
adhesion. 85 This practice accords with the terms of the Royal Proclamation of 17 63, which 
provide in part: 
... if at any Time any of the Said Indians [i.e. the Indian Nations 
with whom the Crown is connected and who live under the 
Crown's protection] should be inclined to dispose of the said 
Lands [i.e. Indian lands which have not been ceded to the 
Crown], the same shall be Purchased only for Us, in our Name, 
at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians, to be 
held for that Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief 
of our Colony respectively within which they shall lie ... 86 
This proclamation has the force of Imperial legislation, and is binding on the Crown's 
executive officers in the dominions of the Crown to which it applies.87 It was issued a few 
months after the Treaty of Paris, by which France ceded the last of its Canadian territories to 
Britain. From the colonial perspective of these European powers, French Canada included 
most, if not all, of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai homeland.88 
In the Court of Appeal, counsel for the Teme-Augama Anishnabai argued that they could not 
have surrendered their land rights merely by accepting benefits under the Robinson-Huron 
Treaty because that would violate the surrender procedure set out in the Royal Proclamation. 
The court got around this difficulty by holding that the proclamation's procedural aspects were 
repealed by the Quebec Act of 177 4. 89 In the court's view, section 3 of that statute preserved 
the Indians' "right, title or possession", but "the procedural requirement for purchase 'at some 
public Meeting or Assembly .. .' was repealed."90 The court no doubt relied on section 4 of the 
Act, which revoked the proclamation "so far as the same relates to the said province of 
Quebec", the boundaries of which were at the same time extended to include most, if not all, of 
84 See text accompanying n.56, supra. 
85 See n.72, supra. 
86 R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No.l, at 6. 
87 The Crown has exceptional prerogative power to legislate in colonies acquired by conquest or cession until a 
legislative assembly is promised or created, or English law is introduced: Campbell v. Hall (1774) Lofft 655; 
Wilcox v. Wilcox (1857), 8 L.C.R. 34 at 81. 
88 See McNeil, supra, n.8 at 186-7, 209-10 n.5. For a more general discussion of the extent of French Canada in 
1763, see Kent McNeil, Native Rights and the Boundaries of Rupert's Land and the North-Western Territory 
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1982). 
89 14 Geo. III, c.83 (Imp.). 
90 [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 95. Steele J. appears to have come to the same conclusion: see [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 
23. 
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the Teme-Augama Anishnabai's lands.91 However, the preamble to that section reveals that 
the repeal related to the proclamation's provisions 
... in respect to the Civil Government of the said Province of 
Quebec, and the Powers and Authorities given to the Governor 
and other Civil Officers of the said Province, ... [which] have 
been found, upon Experience, to be inapplicable to the State and 
Circumstances of the said Province, the Inhabitants whereof 
amounted, at the Conquest, to above Sixty-five thousand 
Persons professing the Religion of the Church of Rome, and 
enjoying an established Form of Constitution and System of 
Laws, by which their Persons and Property had been protected, 
governed, and ordered ... 92 
This and other sections of the Act were therefore intended to remedy the grievances of the 
French Canadians, principally by allowing them to practice their religion and restoring their 
civil law.93 The Act did not affect the Proclamation's provisions for acquisition of Indian 
lands, nor had it been so interpreted prior to the Bear Island case.94 
St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen,95 the leading Canadian case on Indian 
land rights until Calder v. Attorney-General of British Columbia,96 involved the surrender by 
the Saulteaux Indians of their Aboriginal title by Treaty 3 in 1873. The lands involved in the 
case are near Dryden in north-western Ontario, in an area which the Privy Council in 1884 
implicitly held to be within the old province of Quebec, as defined by the Quebec Act.97 In the 
St. Catherine's case, counsel for Ontario made the argument that the Royal Proclamation had 
91 The new boundaries were defined in section 1. On their extent to the north and west, see McNeil (1982), supra, 
n.88 at 20-34. 
92 14 Geo. ill, c.83 (Imp.), s.4. 
93 See generally Hilda Neatby, The Quebec Act: Protest and Policy (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1972). 
94 British officials who negotiated Indian land surrenders in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in what is now 
southern Ontario, which was also included within the extended boundaries of Quebec in 1774, made serious 
efforts to implement the proclamation's surrender provisions: see Peter A. Cumming and Neil H. Mickenberg, 
eds., Native Rights in Canada, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Indian-Inuit Association of Canada, 1972), 107-17. Robert 
Surtees wrote that a provision in the Robinson-Huron Treaty itself, prohibiting alienation of reserve lands by 
the Indians without the consent of the Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, was based on a principle which 
"dated back to the Royal Proclamation, and had been tacitly understood by all parties in the intervening years": 
R.J. Surtees, Indian Land Surrenders in Ontario, 1763-1867 (Ottawa: Indian Affairs, 1984), 98. See also "Plan 
for the Future Management of Indian Affairs", para. 41-3, annexed to "Instructions to Governor Carleton, 1775", 
in Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty, eds, Documents Relating to the Constitutional History of Canada, 2nd ed. 
(Ottawa: King's Printer, 1918), Part 2, 594-620 at 619, where instructions in conformity with the proclamation's 
provisions were given for the purchase of Indian lands. Moreover, the Instructions themselves, in para. 32 at 
607, specifically referred to a provision of the proclamation relating to trade with the Indians as if the 
proclamation's Indian provisions were still in force in the newly-defined province of Quebec. For further 
evidence and discussion, see Darlene Johnston, The Taking of Indian Lands in Canada: Consent or Coercion? 
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native. Law Centre, 1989), 8, 29-31, 46-55. 
95 (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577; (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46. 
96 [1973] S.C.R. 313. 
97 Ontario Boundaries Case, July 22, 1884, P.C. Report embodied in Imperial Order in Council, Aug. 11, 1884, 
reproduced in Proceedings before the ... Privy Council ... Respecting the Westerly Boundary of Ontario (Toronto: 
Warwick and Sons, 1889), 416-18: see discussion in McNeil (1982), supra, n.88 at 26-33. 
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been wholly repealed by that Act. In the Supreme Court of Canada, the argument was 
convincingly refuted by Strong J., who, among other things, said: 
It is nowhere suggested that anything connected with the 
questions of Indians or Indian rights led to this enactment. 
None of the changes in the terms of the proclamation which 
were introduced by the act have the most remote bearing on 
Indian land rights or Indian affairs. Neither the establishment of 
French instead of English law, nor the substitution of a council 
for an assembly, nor the enlargement of the Provincial 
boundaries, can by implication have any such effect, and the act 
does not contain a word expressly referring to the Indians.98 
Before the Privy Council in the St. Catherine's case, counsel for Ontario repeated the argument 
that "the proclamation was superseded by the Imperial Act of 1774, known as the Quebec 
Act".99 The argument was evidently rejected by the Privy Council. Lord Watson, after 
outlining the proclamation's Indian provisions, said: 
The territory in dispute has been in Indian occupation from the 
date of the proclamation until 1873. During that interval of time 
Indian affairs have been administered successively by the 
Crown, by the Provincial Governments, and (since the passing 
of the British North America Act, 1867), by the Government of 
the Dominion. The policy of these administrations has been all 
along the same in this respect, that the Indian inhabitants have 
been precluded from entering into any transaction with a subject 
for the sale or transfer of their interest in the land, and have only 
been permitted to surrender their rights to the Crown by a formal 
contract, duly ratified in a meeting of their chiefs or headmen 
convened for the purpose. loo 
98 (1887), 13 S.C.R. 577 at 629-35, quotation at 631. Strong dissented in the case, but Taschereau J., who 
delivered one of the majority judgments, agreed that the Quebec Act did not affect any rights the Indians had under 
the proclamation: ibid., 648. See also Johnson v. Mcintosh, 8 Wheat. 543 (1823), relied on by Strong, where 
the Supreme Court of the United States held that a private purchase of Indian lands in 1775 was invalidated by the 
proclamation (the lands were within the newly-defined province of Quebec). Marshall C.J., at 597, said: "The 
authority of this proclamation, so far as it respected this continent, has never been denied". 
99 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 50. See also Ontario Lands Case, argument of Edward Blake, counsel for Ontario, in 
St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen (Toronto: Press of the Budget, 1888), 55-9. 
100 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46 at 54. · 
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The Privy Council not only regarded the proclamation's procedural requirements as still in 
force in 1873,101 but also thought that a surrender required a "formal contract", ratified at a 
meeting in accordance with the proclamation's terms.102 
The Supreme Court of Canada did not address the issue of the effect of the Quebec Act on the 
proclamation's procedural requirements in its decision in the Bear Island case. In light of the 
St. Catherine's case and its own pronouncements respecting the proclamation,103 it is 
extremely unlikely that the court approved the Court of Appeal's casual reversal of over 200 
years of legal history. Yet the Teme-Augama Anishnabai did not adhere to the Robinson-
Huron Treaty by a "formal contract", nor had the meeting required by the proclamation been 
held. As the Supreme Court's judgment provides no explanation of how the court got around 
this difficulty, one is left wondering whether the judges were even aware of it. 
But even if non-conformance with the Royal Proclamation could somehow be adequately 
justified in this case (which it has not been), a problem of lack of formal agreement remains. 
We have seen that in the Sioui case Lamer J. said that "what characterizes a treaty is the 
intention to create obligations, the presence of mutually binding obligations and a certain 
measure of solemnity."104 He then quoted the following passage from the judgment of Norris 
J.A. in R. v. White and Bob: 
... on numerous occasions in modem days, rights under what 
were entered into with Indians as solemn engagements, although 
completed with what would now be considered informality, 
have been whittled away on the excuse that they do not comply 
with present day formal requirements and with rules of 
interpretation applicable to transactions between people who 
must be taken in the light of advanced civilization to be of equal 
status. Reliance on instances where this has been done is merely 
to compound injustice without real justification at law ... The 
nature of the transaction itself was consistent with the 
informality of frontier days in this Province [British Columbia] 
and such as the necessities of the occasion and the customs and 
illiteracy of the Indians demanded ... The unusual (by the 
standards of legal draftsmen) nature and form of the document 
considered in the light of the circumstances on Vancouver Island 
in 1854 does not detract from it as being a "Treaty" .105 
101 See also The King v. McMaster, [1926] Ex. C.R. 68 at 72-4; Easterbrook v. The King, [1931] S.C.R. 210 at 214-
15, 217-18; Calder v. A.-G. of British Columbia, [1973] S.C.R. 313, esp. per Hall J., dissenting, at 394-401; R. 
v. Isaac (1975), 13 N.S.R. (2d) 460 at 478, 496; R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
ex parte Indian Association of Alberta, [1982] Q.B. 892, [1981] 4 C.N.L.R. 86 at 92; Guerin v. The Queen, 
[1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120 at 136. All these cases treated the proclamation's Indian provisions as generally still in 
force. 
102 This part of the St. Catherine's decision provides another explanation for the federal government's position prior 
to the Bear Island trial that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai had not adhered to the Robinson-Huron Treaty (see text 
accompanying nn. 44-5, supra), as no "formal contract" had been entered into. 
103 See the Supreme Court decisions cited in n.101, supra. 
104 [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127 at 139. 
105 (1964), 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613 (B.C.C.A.), at 649 (affirmed (1965) 52 D.L.R. (2d) 481), quoted in [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 
127 at 140. Note that Norris's sympathetic approach nonetheless reveals an ethnocentric value judgment 
regarding the relative levels of "civilization" of European and Aboriginal societies. 
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Lamer remarked that this passage shows both "the importance of the historical context ... [and] 
that formalities are of secondary importance in deciding on the nature of a document containing 
an agreement with the Indians. "106 He went on to decide that a document signed in 1760 on 
behalf of the British Crown by General Murray, certifying that peace had been made with the 
Hurons of Lorette and guaranteeing certain rights to them, was a treaty.107 
In both White and Bob and Sioui, the Crown argued that lack of formalities negated the 
existence of a treaty. Norris and Lamer refused to allow the Crown to avoid its solemn 
engagements with the Indians in this way. In each case, a written agreement existed, and the 
Indians had relied on the commitment of the Crown contained therein. In Sioui, Lamer 
adopted the rule in Simon v. The Queen that "Indian treaties should be given a fair, large and 
liberal construction in favour of the Indians", 108 and applied it to the issue of whether a treaty 
had been entered into.109 In deciding whether General Murray had the capacity to sign a 
treaty, Lamer therefore said that it was 
... necessary to take the Indians' point of view and to ask 
whether it was reasonable for them to believe, in light of the 
circumstances and the position occupied by the party they were 
dealing with directly, that they had before them a person capable 
of binding the British Crown by treaty.110 
So on the issue of whether a treaty exists, it seems that doubts should be resolved in the 
Indians' favour. One consequence of this is that the Crown cannot use a lack of formalities to 
avoid its commitments. But where a lack of formalities casts doubt on whether a common 
intention to create mutually-binding obligations was present, and the Indians involved claim 
that they did not enter a treaty, resolution of the issue in the Indians' favour should lead to a 
conclusion that a treaty relationship was not created. 
Lack of formalities is particularly significant when the treaty, unlike that in Sioui, involved a 
surrender of Aboriginal title. At trial in the Bear Island case, Steele J. appears to have regarded 
Aboriginal title as non-proprietary.Ill He was therefore able to conclude: 
A treaty is not a conveyance of title because title is already in the 
Crown. A treaty is merely a simple acknowledgement that may 
be formal or informal in nature.112 
His view that Aboriginal title is non-proprietary was based on an erroneous interpretation of St. 
Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen,113 an interpretation which has since been 
rejected by the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Canadian Pacific 
106 [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127 at 140. 
107 As this was before the issuance of the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and did not involve a surrender of lands, the 
procedure in the proclamation (discussed in text accompanying nn. 86-102, supra) did not have to be followed. 
108 [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 at 167. 
109 [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127at134. 
110 Ibid., 137. 
111 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 26-34. For further discussion, see McNeil, supra, n.8 at 189-91, 204-07. 
112 [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 82. 
113 (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46. 
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Limited v. Paul. 114 In the Paul case, the court did not accept the view that the St. Catherine's 
case decided that "Indian title is merely a personal right which cannot be elevated to the status 
of a proprietary interest so as to compete on an equal footing with other proprietary 
interests. "115 
As Aboriginal title clearly entails a proprietary interest in land, it should be accorded the same 
degree of legal protection as other real property interests. One of these protections is that, 
statutes of limitation aside, title to land cannot be lost or transferred without appropriate 
formalities. At common law, this generally involved either a physical handing over of the land 
in the presence of witnesses or a duly executed deed, depending on whether the interest being 
transferred was corporeal or incorporeal in nature.116 Transfers of interests in land to or from 
the Crown had to be by deed, which had to be enroled in a court of record or Parliament to be 
valid.117 While statutory changes have made interests in land generally transferable by deed, 
formal requirements such as signature and delivery still must be complied with.118 Land is too 
valuable, and certainty of title too important, for casual dealings to be sanctioned. 
In the case of Aboriginal title, a formal procedure for surrendering it to the Crown was 
established by the Royal Proclamation of 1763. As we have seen, that involved a public 
meeting or assembly of the Aboriginal people concerned, held for that purpose by the Crown's 
representatives. Although the proclamation did not expressly say that a written document had 
to be signed, that may have been implicit, and in any case became the established practice. The 
idea that Aboriginal title could be surrendered to the Crown without express agreement at a 
public meeting, and without a signed document, probably never occurred to anyone before the 
Bear Island case. Moreover, the Court of Appeal's solution to this problem is no solution at 
all, because if the Quebec Act repealed the proclamation's procedural requirements for the 
surrender of Aboriginal title within the colony of Quebec,119 these surrenders would still have 
to be governed by some law to be legally effective. If the proclamation did not apply, then the 
common law respecting transfers to the Crown by deed enroled would likely have to be 
114 (1988] 2 S.C.R. 654, [1989] 1 C.N.L.R. 47 at 59. fu fact, the issue had been decided a century earlier. In A.-G. 
of Ontario v. Francis (1889), 2 C.N.L.C. 6, decided immediately after the St. Catherine's case, Ferguson H.C.J., 
at 23-5, examined the Privy Council's decision and concluded that it was consistent with his view that the Indians 
have a beneficial interest in their unsurrendered lands which entitles them, among other things, to the timber 
growing thereon. The Francis case is particularly relevant because it involved land which the Aboriginal parties 
to the Robinson-Huron Treaty excluded from the land surrender and retained for themselves as a reserve, so that it 
remained subject to their Aboriginal title. At 25, Ferguson said: "The rights of the Indians in respect of this 
land, and the rights that they had in respect of the timber thereon, were rights and interests other than that of the 
province in the same, to say the very least". For some unexplained reason this important decision was not 
reported, until found in the Ontario Archives by Bennett McCardle and printed in Canadian Native Law Cases in 
1981. 
115 [1989] 1 C.N.L.R. 47 at 59. The Paul decision was presaged in this respect by A.-G. for Quebec v. A.-G. for 
Canada, (1921] 1 AC. 401 at 408, and Guerin v. The Queen, (1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120 at 136, where it was decided 
that the description of Aboriginal title as a "personal" right simply meant that it is inalienable, other than by 
surrender to the Crown. See McNeil, supra, n.8 at 190. 
116 See Derek Mendes da Costa and Richard J. Balfour, Property Law: Cases, Text and Materials, 2nd ed. by Eileen E. 
Gillese (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 1990), 9:1-3. 
117 See Edward Coke, The First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, or a Commentary upon Littleton, 15th 
ed. (London: E. & R. Brooke, 1794), at 260a; Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of the Prerogatives of the 
Crown (London: Butterworth and Son, 1820), at 389-91. 
118 See T.G. Youdan, "The Formal Requirements of a Deed" (1979) 5 Business L.R. 71-88. 
119 See text accompanying nn. 89-102, supra, where the Court of Appeal's views on this matter are shown to be 
erroneous. 
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invoked. In either case, the Teme-Augama Anishnabai cannot have surrendered their land 
rights because the procedures required by law were not followed. 
Both absence of mutual intention to enter into a treaty relationship and lack of compliance with 
formalities for the surrender of Aboriginal title should have led the Supreme Court to decide 
that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai did not adhere to the Robinson-Huron Treaty. But there are 
other problems with this aspect of the court's decision as well. We have already seen that the 
Teme-Augama Anishnabai did not receive all the benefits they would have been entitled to if 
they had become parties to the treaty.120 The Supreme Court acknowledged this by observing: 
It is conceded that the Crown has failed to comply with some of 
its obligations under this agreement, and thereby breached its 
fiduciary obligations to the Indians. These matters currently 
form the subject of negotiations between the parties. It does not 
alter the fact, however, that the aboriginal right has been 
extinguished.121 
If, as the court held, an Aboriginal people can become party to a treaty simply by accepting 
benefits, one might think that they would have to be accorded full treaty benefits for the 
adhesion to be complete or their land rights to be lost.122 Yet this was not the approach the 
Supreme Court adopted in this case, for acceptance of some benefits sufficed to extinguish the 
Aboriginal title of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai. The question which then arises is this: What 
proportion of the benefits has to be accepted before adhesion takes place? Is acceptance of 
treaty annuities enough? If so, for how many years? Or does a reserve- even if inadequate by 
the treaty's standards and not in accordance with the Aboriginal people's wishes - have to be 
accepted too? These questions must be answered in order to determine the date of adhesion. 
This date is important because the land surrender would not take effect until the adhesion was 
complete. If the adhesion did not take place until 1943 when the lands for the reserve on Bear 
Island were first set aside, or until 1971 when the reserve was officially created, Crown grants 
of land within the land claim area prior to those dates may not have been effective.123 
Unfortunately, neither the Supreme Court nor the lower courts in Bear Island gave any 
indication of what benefits must be accepted for an adhesion to take place, or when the 
adhesion took effect in this particular case.124 
120 See text accompanying n.43, supra. 
121 [1991] 3 C.N.L.R. 79 at 81. 
122 In Anglo-Canadian contract law, even when a valid contract has been created, partial performance by one party 
generally does not entitle that party to claim payment or performance by the other: see Fridman, supra, n.62 at 
489-93, 503-08; Furmston, supra, n.62 at 517-20; Guest, supra, n.62 at 419-22. In the context of an agreement 
for the sale of land, this means that, in the absence of a term to the contrary in the agreement, the vendor does 
not have to convey the title until the purchase price is paid. 
123 The Crown could not derogate from the Aboriginal title of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai by grant because that 
title is proprietary (see text accompanying nn. 111-15, supra), and a fundamental common law rule prevents the 
Crown from derogating from vested property rights: see The Queen v. Hughes (1866), L.R. 1 P.C. 81 at 87-8; 
Bristow v. Cormican (1878), 3 App. Cas. 641; Drulard v. Welsh (1906), 11 0.L.R. 647 at 656, reversed on other 
grounds (1907), 14 O.L.R. 54; Chitty, supra, n.117 at 386. Moreover, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
prohibited grants of Indian lands which had not been ceded to the Crown. 
124 For discussion of this aspect of the lower courts' decisions, see McNeil, supra, n.8 at 195-6. 
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4. Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title 
As we have seen, the Supreme Court held that the Aboriginal title of the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai had been surrendered and therefore extinguished by adhesion to the Robinson-
Huron Treaty. The court did not comment on the ruling by the Ontario Court of Appeal that, 
even if the Teme-Augama Anishnabai did not become parties to the treaty by signature or 
adhesion, their land rights were unilaterally extinguished by the treaty because it was an 
expression of the will of the sovereign to extinguish Aboriginal title throughout the treaty 
area.125 Elsewhere, I have argued that this ruling is not good law, first, because the Teme-
Augama Anishnabai's lands are not within the treaty area, and secondly, because the Crown 
does not have the authority to extinguish Aboriginal title by unilateral executive action.126 The 
first argument is based on interpretation of the treaty, and the second on the fundamental 
common law rule that the Crown cannot derogate from vested property rights.127 The idea that 
the Crown can unilaterally extinguish Aboriginal title comes from American law and a 
misapplication of St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Co. v. The Queen,128 and is no longer 
viable in light of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Canadian Pacific Limited v. 
Pauf.129 
However, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Bear Island that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai's 
title was extinguished by adhesion (assuming adhesion took place, which in my view never 
happened) is problematic as well. The Supreme Court simply assumed, without explanation or 
analysis, that their title would be extinguished if they adhered to the treaty. But that 
assumption depends on how the treaty is interpreted, a question of law which the court could 
not avoid by deferring to the trial judge, as it did with respect to questions of fact.130 No 
doubt the Supreme Court based its assumption on the written terms of the treaty, which, 
among other things, provide that the Aboriginal parties 
... fully, freely and voluntarily surrender, cede, grant, and 
convey unto Her Majesty, her heirs and successors forever, all 
their right, title, and interest to, and in the whole of, the territory 
above described, save and except the reservations set forth in the 
schedule hereunto annexed ... 131 
However, in Simon v. The Queen, Dickson C.J.C., delivering the unanimous decision of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, said that "Indian treaties should be given a fair, large and liberal 
construction in favour of the Indians." 132 He relied on his earlier statement of the principles of 
treaty interpretation in Nowegijick v. The Queen, where, again for a unanimous court, he said: 
125 [1989] 3 C.N.L.R. 73 at 85-8. See also [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 at 20, 77-81. 
126 McNeil, supra n.8, 197-207. 
127 See authority in n.123, supra. 
128 (1888), 14 App. Cas. 46. 
129 [1989] 1 C.N.L.R. 47 at 59: see text accompanying nn. 111-15, supra, and McNeil, supra, n.8 at 200-07. See 
also Hamar Foster, "It Goes Without Saying: Precedent and the Doctrine of Extinguislunent by Implication in 
Delgamuukw et al. v. The Queen" (1991) 49 The Advocate 341-57, esp. 344-5. 
13 0 See text accompanying nn. 4-6, supra. 
131 Text of the treaty, in Morris, supra, n.43 at 305. 
132 [1986] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 at 167. 
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... treaties and statutes relating to Indians should be liberally 
construed and doubtful expressions resolved in favour of the 
Indian ... In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, it was held that 
"Indian treaties must be construed, not according to the technical 
meaning of their words, but in the sense that they would 
naturally be understood by the Indians. "133 
63 
These principles of treaty interpretation have been approved in a number of subsequent 
Supreme Court decisions.134 The rationale for them was partially explained by Wilson J. in R. 
v. Horseman: 
These treaties were the product of negotiation between very 
different cultures and the language used in them probably does 
not reflect, and should not be expected to reflect, with total 
accuracy each party's understanding of their effect at the time 
they were entered into. This is why the courts must be 
especially sensitive to the broader historical context in which 
such treaties were negotiated. They must be prepared to look at 
that historical context in order to ensure that they reach a proper 
understanding of the meaning that particular treaties held for 
their signatories at the time.135 
The Nowegijick principles contained in the passage from that case quoted above contain "[t]wo 
elements of liberal interpretation", as Dickson C.J.C. pointed out in Mitchell v. Peguis Indian 
Band: 
(1) ambiguities in the interpretation of treaties and statutes 
relating to Indians are to be resolved in favour of the Indians, 
and (2) aboriginal understandings of words and corresponding 
legal concepts in Indian treaties are to be preferred over more 
legalistic and technical constructions. In some cases, the two 
elements are indistinguishable, but in other cases the interpreter 
will only be able to perceive that there is an ambiguity by first 
invoking the second element.136 
The surrender provision in the Robinson-Huron Treaty therefore should first be examined to 
see if it contains any ambiguities. On its face, it may seem to be "clear and plain",137 as it 
133 [1983) 1 S.C.R. 29, [1983] 2 C.N.L.R. 89 at 94. 
134 See R. v. Horse, [1988) 1 S.C.R. 187, [1988) 2 C.N.L.R. 112 at 124-6; R. v. Horseman [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, 
[1990) 3 C.N.L.R. 95 at 102, 108-09; A.-G. of Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127, esp. 134; Sparrow v. 
The Queen, [1990) 3 C.N.L.R. 160 at 179-80; Mitchell v. Peguis Indian Band, [1990) 2 S.C.R. 85, [1990] 3 
C.N.L.R. 46 at 64, 75-6. 
135 [1990) 3 C.N.L.R. 95 at 109. Note that Wilson J., Dickson C.J.C. and L'Heureux-Dube J. concurring, dissented 
on the interpretation of paragraph 12 of the Alberta Natural Resources Transfer Agreement in that case. 
13 6 [1990) 3 C.N.L.R. 46 at 76 (note that Dickson disagreed with the other members of the court on the application 
of the Nowegijick principles to the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.1-6, in this particular case, but the court appears 
to have agreed generally on the application of those principles to treaties). 
137 The "clear and plain" test for extinguishment, articulated by Hall J. in his dissenting opinion in Calder v. A.-G. 
of British Columbia, [1973) S.C.R. 313 at 404, was adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Sparrow v. The 
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states in broad terms that the Aboriginal parties "surrender, cede, [etc.] all their right, title, and 
interest to, and in the whole of, the territory" .138 However, the treaty also provides that the 
Aboriginal parties have 
... the full and free privilege to hunt over the territory now ceded 
by them, and to fish in the waters thereof, as they have 
heretofore been in the habit of doing; saving and excepting such 
portions of the said territory as may from time to time be sold or 
leased to individuals or companies of individuals, and occupied 
by them with the consent of the Crown.139 
By this provision, the Aboriginal parties retained their rights to hunt and fish on any ungranted 
lands within the surrendered territory.140 At common law, a right to hunt or fish enjoyed by 
people generally is not proprietary in nature, being classified instead as a public right.141 But 
if the right is held by an individual or the members of a definable group, it is either a 
proprietary profit a prendre or, in the case of an exclusive right to fish, a privately-owned 
fishery.142 In either case, the right to hunt or fish amounts to an interest in land. If this law 
were directly applicable to the Robinson-Huron Treaty, the retained rights to hunt and fish 
would entail a continuing interest in the surrendered lands.143 However, in reference to an 
Aboriginal right to fish in Sparrow v. The Queen, Dickson C.J.C. and La Forest J. said: 
Queen, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160 at 174-5. In both those cases, the issue was extinguislunent by legislation, but 
the test for extinguislunent by treaty should be at least as stringent, given that treaties are to be interpreted in 
favour of the Indians and in accordance with their understanding of them. 
13 8 Text of the treaty, in Morris, supra, n.43 at 305. The term "territory" may raise a question about what is being 
surrendered because it could relate to title to territory as understood in international law rather than land rights, 
but the immediately preceding words "to, and in the whole of," could be interpreted to include both. Some 
ambiguity nonetheless is present here. 
13 9 Ibid., 306. 
140 See R. v. Agawa (1988), 28 O.A.C. 201, [1988] 3 C.N.L.R. 73, where the Ontario Court of Appeal regarded a 
virtually identical provision in the Robinson-Superior Treaty of 1850 as amounting to a treaty right to hunt and 
fish in the context of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, 
(U.K.) 1982, c.11. However, this does not mean that the treaty created the right. In Simon v. The Queen, [1986] 
1 C.N.L.R. 153 at 172, Dickson C.J.C. said that a provision in a 1752 treaty guaranteeing the Micmacs the "free 
liberty of hunting and Fishing as usual" "did not create new hunting or fishing rights but merely recognized pre-
existing rights". See also R. v. Padjena and Quesawa (1930), 4 C.N.L.C. 411; Denny, Paul and Sylliboy v. The 
Queen, [1990] 2 C.N.L.R. 115 at 122-7. 
141 For example, at common law there is a public right to fish in tidal waters: see A.-G. for British Columbia v. A.-G. 
for Canada, [1914] A.C. 153; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed. (London: Butterworths & Co., 1973-86), vol. 
18, para. 609-14; Gerard V. La Forest, Water Law in Canada - The Atlantic Provinces (Ottawa: Information 
Canada, 1973), 195-9. 
142 See Halsbury's Laws, supra, n.141, vol. 14, para. 240-58, vol. 18, para. 615-50; Sir Robert Megarry and H.W.R. 
Wade, The Law of Real Property, 4th ed. (London: Stevens & Sons, 1984), 65-6, 850-1, 911-12. 
143 In Wickham v. Hawker (1840), 7 M. & W. 63, a reservation of the liberty "to hawk, hunt, fish and fowl at any 
time" in a conveyance of land was held to operate as a grant of a proprietary profit a prendre back to the alienors, 
so that they maintained an interest in the land. See also Musgrave v. Foster (1871), L.R. 6 Q.B. 590; Irvine v. 
Osborne (1891), 25 Ir. L.T. 36; Reynolds v. Moore, [1898] 2 Ir. R. 641. However, in R. v. Commanda (1939), 
72 C.C.C. 246, it was held that the hunting and fishing rights provision in the Robinson-Huron Treaty did not 
give rise to a trust or interest within the meaning of section 109 of the British North America Act, 1867 (now the 
Constitution Act, I867), 30 & 31 Viet., c.3 (U.K.), and in Pawis v. The Queen (1979), 102 D.L.R (3d) 602, 
[1979] 2 C.N.L.R. 52 at 63-5, a similar claim to a trust under the same provision was dismissed. Both 
Commanda andPawis relied onA.-G.for Canada v.A.-G.for Ontario, [1897] A.C. 199, where the Privy Council 
held that the annuity provision in the Robinson-Huron Treaty did not create a trust or interest in the lands 
surrendered by the treaty. However, unlike an annuity which the Privy Council held to be a personal obligation, 
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Fishing rights are not traditional property rights. They are rights 
held by a collective and are in keeping with the culture and 
existence of that group. Courts must be careful, then, to avoid 
the application of traditional common law concepts of property 
as they develop their understanding of what the reasons for 
judgment in Guerin [[1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120, at 136] referred to 
as the "sui generis" nature of aboriginal rights.144 
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While this passage reveals that the Supreme Court is probably unwilling to apply common law 
concepts respecting profits a prendre and privately-owned fisheries directly to Aboriginal 
fishing rights, it should not be read as a denial that those rights are as proprietary as equivalent 
common law rights.145 The court's decision in Canadian Pacific Limited v. Pau[146 that 
Aboriginal land rights are proprietary shows that the sui generis nature of those rights cannot 
be used as a justification for denying them proprietary status. As Aboriginal land rights clearly 
include a right to hunt and fish,147 that right must also be proprietary. Retention in the 
Robinson-Huron Treaty of the hunting and fishing aspect of the Aboriginal parties' land rights 
therefore has to operate as a qualification on the surrender provision.148 
Interpreting the hunting and fishing provision as a qualification on the surrender provision is in 
keeping with the rule that treaties are to be interpreted in favour of the Aboriginal parties. 
Moreover, this approach probably corresponds more closely to the understanding of the 
Aboriginal peoples who signed the treaty in 1850. For them, hunting and fishing were the 
most important uses they made of the land, as their economies were based primarily on those 
a retained right to hunt and fish is proprietary, as the English and Irish cases cited above clearly show. As this 
distinction does not appear to have been sufficiently considered in Commanda and Pawis, they should not be 
regarded as authoritative in this respect. Moreover, in Dick v. The Queen, [1985) 2 S.C.R. 309, [1985) 4 
C.N.L.R. 55 at 59, the Supreme Court of Canada left open the question of whether an Aboriginal right to hunt is a 
profit a prendre or other interest in land. 
144 [1990) 3 C.N.L.R. 160 at 182. See also Saanichton Marine Ltd. v. Claxton (1989), 57 D.L.R. (4th) 161, [1989) 
3 C.N.L.R. 46, and Hamar Foster, "The Saanichton Bay Marina Case: Imperial Law, Colonial History and 
Competing Theories of Aboriginal Title" (1989) 23 U.B.C. Law Rev. 629-50. 
145 For an insightful cross-cultural perspective on the rights of the Dene in the Northwest Territories to the animals 
they hunt, see Michael Asch, "Wildlife: Defining the Animals the Dene Hunt and the Settlement of Aboriginal 
Rights Claims" (1989) 15 Canadian Public Policy 205-19. 
146 [1989) 1 C.N.L.R. 47 at 59. 
147 See Steele J.'s decision in the Bear Island case, [1985] 1C.N.L.C.1 at 39; Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian 
Affairs, [1979] 3 C.N.L.R. 17 at 50; Delgamuukw v. The Queen, [1991) 3 W.W.R. 97, [1991) 5 C.N.L.R. 
(Special Edition) 1 at 12, 214. 
148 Classifying the hunting and fishing right as proprietary is not inconsistent with the provision in the treaty 
which allows the Crown to exclude certain lands from Aboriginal hunting and fishing by selling or leasing them. 
In Anglo-Canadian law, this provision would give the er.own a "power", which in Halsbury's Laws, supra, n.141, 
vol. 36, para. 801, is referred to as 
... a term of art, denoting an authority vested in a person, called 'the donee', to 
deal with or dispose of property not his own. A power may be created by 
reservation or limitation; the dealing or disposition may be total or partial, and 
for the benefit either of the donee or of others; and the property may be real or 
personal. A power is distinct from the dominion a man has over his own 
property. (footnotes omitted) 
However, this power over Aboriginal hunting and fishing rights would not be unlimited, as the Crown has a 
fiduciary obligation towards the Aboriginal peoples, especially after they have surrendered their lands: see 
Guerin v. The Queen, [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120; Sparrow v. The Queen, [1990) 3 C.N.L.R. 160, esp. 180, 183-4. 
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activities.149 William Robinson, who negotiated the treaty for the Crown, acknowledged this 
in his official report when he wrote that, "by securing [their reserves] to them and the right of 
hunting and fishing over the ceded territory, they cannot say that the Government takes from 
them their usual means of subsistence" .150 He also told them that, unlike lands further south, 
which were "occupied by the whites in such a manner as to preclude the possibility of Indian 
hunting over or having access to them[,] ... the lands now ceded are notoriously barren and 
sterile, and will in all probability never be settled except in a few localities by mining 
companies" )51 As the Aboriginal parties to the treaty were told that they could continue to 
derive their subsistence from the land, they may well have thought that, apart from a few 
mining sites, they were really giving up very little.152 
The monetary compensation which Robertson offered may well have confirmed this 
impression. In his report, he wrote that he told the Indians that 
... the two chiefs who were in Toronto last winter 
(Shinguacouse and Nebennigoebing) only asked the amount 
which the Government had received for mining locations, after 
deducting the expenses attending their sale. That amount was 
about eight thousand pounds which the Government would pay 
them without any annuity or certainty of further benefit; or one-
half of it down, and an annuity of about one thousand 
pounds. 153 
According to Robinson, the chiefs "all preferred the latter option", though Shinguacouse and 
Nebennigoebing insisted on an annuity of ten dollars per person, giving in only when they saw 
149 See Diamond Jenness, The Ojibway Indians of Parry Island, Their Social and Religious Life (Ottawa: King's 
Printer, 1935), 10-17; Charles A. Bishop, 'The Emergence of Hunting Territories Among the Northern Ojibwa" 
(1970) 9 Ethnology 1-15. 
150 W.B. Robinson to Colonel Bruce, Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, 24 September 1850, in Morris, 
supra, n.43, 17-21, at 19. 
151 Ibid., 17. These factors were used by Robinson to justify the lower annuities he was offering. 
15 2 An example of this kind of Aboriginal understanding of a treaty may be found in the treaty commissioner's report 
on Treaty 9, which was negotiated in 1905-06 with the Ojibway and Cree in the area immediately north of the 
Robinson Treaties. The commissioners reported that, at Fort Hope on the Albany River, 
Moonias, one of the most influential chiefs, asked a number of questions. He 
said that ever since he was able to earn anything, and that was from the time he 
was very young, he had never been given something for nothing; that he always 
had to pay for everything that he got, even if it was only a paper of pins. 
"Now," he said "you gentlemen come to us from the King offering to give us 
benefits for which we can make no return. How is this?" Father Fafard thereupon 
explained to him the nature of the treaty, and that by it the Indians were giving 
their faith and allegiance to the King, and for giving up their title to a large area 
of land of which they could make no use, they received benefits that served to 
balance anything that they were giving. 
Duncan C. Scott, Samuel Stewart, and Daniel G. MacMartin to the Superintendent-General of Indian Affairs, 6 
November 1905, in The James Bay Treaty (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1964 reprint of 1931 edition), 3-11, at 6. 
One may wonder how many Aboriginal people signed treaties without asking the direct question Chief Moonias 
posed, and without hearing the explanation he received. 
153 Supra,n.150 at 17. 
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that the other chiefs were prepared to accept the offer Robinson had made.154 As the cash 
payment and annuities appeared to provide compensation only for lands which had already 
been taken for mining, Robinson inserted an additional clause in the treaty, 
... that should the territory hereby ceded by the [Indians] at any 
future period produce such an amount as will enable the 
Government of this Province, without incurring loss, to increase 
the annuity hereby secured to them, then and in that case the 
same shall be augmented from time to time, provided that the 
amount paid to each individual shall not exceed the sum of one 
pound Provincial currency in any one year, or such further sum 
as Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to order ... 155 
Robinson reported that "[t]his was so reasonable and just that I had no difficulty in making 
them comprehend it, and it in a great measure silenced the clamor raised by their evil 
advisers. "156 
From Robinson's report, the bargain that seems to have been made was principally for past and 
future mining sites, with the Aboriginal parties to retain the right to use the rest of the lands as 
they had always done. Further investigation of the historical context, which the Supreme 
Court has said is essential to understand Indian treaties,157 would have to be conducted to 
clarify the Aboriginal understanding of this particular treaty.158 But enough has been said to 
reveal that the surrender provision is not as straight-forward as it appears at first glance, and 
probably did not involve a complete extinguishment of Aboriginal title. 
As the Supreme Court decided in the Bear Island case that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai 
became parties to the Robinson-Huron Treaty by adhesion, their position is different from that 
of the original Aboriginal signatories. The historical context in the 1880s (or whenever the 
154 Ibid., 18. The monetary compensation the Aboriginal parties received under the Robinson Treaties (4000 
pounds in cash plus annuities totalling 1100 pounds) was very close to the amount Robinson told them the 
government had received from mining locations: see the text of the treaties in Morris, supra, n.43 at 302, 305. 
155 Robinson-Huron Treaty, in Morris, supra, n.43 at 306. 
156 Supra, n.150 at 18-19. Note that the annuity payments were later increased from 96 cents to $4 per person: ibid., 
18, Morris's note. On liability for these increases, as between Canada and Ontario, see A.-G. for Canada v. A.-G. 
for Ontario, [1897] A.C. 199. 
157 In addition to the passage from Wilson's judgment in R. v. Horseman cited in text accompanying n.135, supra, 
see A.-G. of Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127, esp. 133-4: "courts ... must take into account the historical 
context and perception each party might have as to the nature of the undertaking contained in the document under 
consideration." 
15 8 Evidence from Aboriginal witnesses that their understanding differed from the written terms was presented and 
accepted in A.-G. of Ontario v. Francis (1889), 2 C.N.L.C. 6. At issue were the boundaries of one of the reserves, 
which were described in the treaty in miles. Ferguson H.C.J. found that the word "mile" was meaningless to the 
Aboriginal parties. At 17-18, he wrote: ''They did not and do not know what is meant by a mile, or a league, or 
the difference between the two measures, nor indeed any measure that to us would be a measure at all." In fact, the 
word in their language which signified the measure of distance was also used for other measures, such as volume. 
To resolve the problem, Ferguson relied on their geographic description by place names of the limits of their 
reserve, and concluded at 17 that there could be no doubt "that this tract of land was what these Indians honestly 
thought they were getting as their reserve, and in my opinion the evidence shows that it is the tract of land they 
did get as their reserve." This is just one illustration of the inevitable problems of interpretation which arise in 
the cross-cultural context of Indian treaties, even with respect to terms which from an Anglo-Canadian 
perspective appear perfectly clear. 
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adhesion took place) at Lake Temagami obviously would not have been the same as at Sault 
Ste. Marie where the treaty was originally signed in 1850. Moreover, cultural differences 
between the Teme-Augama Anishnabai and the original signatories could have resulted in 
divergent understandings. 
The Supreme Court said in Sparrow that the onus is on the Crown to prove extinguishment of 
Aboriginal rights, and that the intention to extinguish must be "clear and plain".159 In the 
context of an alleged surrender of land rights by treaty, this means that the Crown would have 
to show a mutual intention for those rights to be extinguished.160 Given that treaties must be 
interpreted in their historical context as the Aboriginal parties would have understood them,161 
the Crown could not rely simply on the written terms without evidence that the Aboriginal 
parties understood that the treaty involved a surrender of their land rights. At a minimum, this 
would involve proof that the written terms of the treaty had been explained to them, and that 
they understood and assented to the surrender. 
None of the judgments delivered in the Bear Island case reveal that the Crown produced 
convincing proof that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai understood that adhesion to the Robinson-
Huron Treaty would result in extinguishment of their Aboriginal land rights.162 Evidence of 
their understanding of the treaty does not appear to have been given because they maintained 
throughout the trial that they did not adhere to it. Therefore, after finding that they did adhere, 
the Supreme Court should not have simply assumed that their Aboriginal land rights were 
extinguished. Instead, the court should have sent the case back to trial, where evidence could 
have been led to determine what effect the Teme-Augama Anishnabai thought the treaty would 
have on their rights. The relationship between the land surrender provision and the hunting 
and fishing rights provision could then have been considered in light of that evidence. By 
denying the Teme-Augama Anishnabai the opportunity of giving their interpretation of the 
treaty, the Supreme Court violated one of its own principles of treaty interpretation. 
5. Conclusions 
In the Bear Island case, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that the Teme-Augama 
Anishnabai had an Aboriginal right to their lands before adhering to the Robinson-Huron 
Treaty, and so overruled Steele J.'s contrary view. To reach this decision, the Supreme Court 
probably concluded that the Teme-Augama Anishnabai were a distinct Aboriginal society, at 
least by the time the treaty was originally signed in 1850. This ruling vindicated the Teme-
Augama Anishnabai's claim to Aboriginal rights stemming from their existence as an 
159 [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 160 at 174-5. This principle also applies to treaty rights: see R. v. Horseman, [1990] 3 
C.N.L.R. 95 at 102; A.G. of Quebec v. Sioui, [1990] 3 C.N.L.R. 127 at 151. In Simon v. The Queen, [1986] 1 
C.N.L.R. 153 at 170, Dickson C.J.C. said: "Given the serious and far-reaching consequences of a finding that a 
treaty right has been extinguished, it seems appropriate to demand strict proof of the fact of extinguishment in 
each case where the issue arises." 
160 For an instance where lack of mutual intention led a court to conclude that a land surrender provision may not 
have been effective, see Re Paulette's Application (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8, [1973] 6 W.W.R. 97 at 138-43, 
reversed on other grounds (1975), 63 D.L.R. (3d) 1, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 628. 
161 See text accompanying nn. 133-5, 157, supra. 
162 The Court of Appeal commented on the fact that few Aboriginal witnesses were called, and that the quality of the 
testimony given did not match that in Re Paulette's Application (1973), 42 D.L.R. (3d) 8 (where extensive 
evidence of the Aboriginal understanding of Treaties 8 and 11 was presented): [1989] 2 C.N.L.R. 73 at 76. 
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Aboriginal people and their occupation of their traditional homeland. They are therefore 
entitled to continue to assert any Aboriginal rights - such as a possible right to self-government 
- that were not surrendered by the treaty. 
On the issue of adhesion, the Supreme Court simply assumed that an Aboriginal people can 
become party to a treaty by accepting benefits under it. In doing so, the court ignored general 
principles relating to the creation of mutually-binding agreements. It also disregarded the 
procedure for the surrender of Aboriginal land rights laid down in the Royal Proclamation of 
1763, and followed in other treaties and adhesions, including the Robinson-Huron Treaty 
itself. In effect, the court held that those rights can be given up in a casual and informal way, 
without an actual transfer of title. As the common law has never sanctioned such 
unceremonious dealings in land, this holding appears to be inconsistent with the court's 
previously-expressed view that Aboriginal title is proprietary. Moreover, in this particular case 
it seems to ignore the established rule that the intention to extinguish Aboriginal rights must be 
"clear and plain". 
The Supreme Court also took for granted that adhesion to the treaty necessarily resulted in the 
complete extinguishment of the Teme-Augama Anishnabai's land rights. The court did so 
without analysis of the treaty's terms, and in particular without discussing the relationship 
between the surrender provision and the hunting and fishing rights provision. The court 
accordingly failed to apply its own principles of treaty interpretation, specifically that 
ambiguities must be resolved in the Aboriginal parties' favour, and that treaties must be 
interpreted in their historical context as the Aboriginal parties would have understood them. If 
there was insufficient evidence to apply these principles at the Supreme Court level, the case 
should have been sent back to trial where that evidence could have been presented. 
The Supreme Court's decision in this case can best be described as inadequate. The absence of 
analysis and the failure to apply established principles is both puzzling and disappointing. 
These weaknesses also make the decision valueless as a precedent. There are no clear 
principles to be gathered from it, and scant direction for other courts to decide Aboriginal rights 
cases. As the decision departs from the development of Aboriginal rights jurisprudence by the 
Supreme Court over the past ten years, the best approach may simply be to ignore it. 
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